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isfy in an Era of Excess. Robert H.
Frank. Free Press, New York, 1999. 326
pp. $25.00 (ISBN 0-684-84234-3 cloth).
E
conomist Robert H. Frank has writ-
ten a stimulating book that inte-
grates research from psychology, evo-
lutionary biology, and economics to
address the raging “luxury fever” that
is needlessly consuming precious re-
sources in “overdeveloped” economies.
Frank documents how luxury con-
sumption in western industrialized
countries has been rising at an astro-
nomical rate even though recent psy-
chological research shows that there is
scant correlation between this con-
sumption and levels of stated life satis-
faction.
Why, then, are some wrist watches
selling for $20,000, huge houses of
10,000 square feet or more being built,
and myriad other forms of conspicu-
ous individual consumption rapidly
increasing, even as social spending on
education, infrastructure, the environ-
ment, and other things that would
raise the average level of life satisfac-
tion in society is decreasing? Frank
describes how this perverse “luxury
fever” occurs when individuals pursue
their strong individual incentives to
increase their relative position in soci-
ety by consuming more than their
peers. But when everyone behaves in
this way, relative consumption (and
perceived life satisfaction) remain con-
stant, while absolute consumption
(and related negative impacts on nat-
ural resource use, the environment,
and education spending) soars.
Luxury fever is one of a class of phe-
nomena known by various names in
different disciplines: negative external-
ities (Pigou 1940), social traps (Cross
and Guyer 1980, Costanza 1987),
social dilemmas (Ostrom et al. 1999),
the prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod
1984), and the tragedy of the com-
mons (Hardin 1968). Frank cleverly
labels these phenomena as situations
that are “smart for one, but dumb for
all.” Once one begins to look, clear
examples of these situations can be
found everywhere, in such phenomena
as drug addiction, pesticide overuse,
arms races, environmental pollution,
and high fashion. Although these phe-
nomena have been recognized by eco-
nomists, they have largely been rele-
gated to the status of interesting but
relatively minor anomalies. But Frank
clearly points out just how pervasive,
important, and wasteful they are and
how eliminating them can save literally
billions of dollars while actually
improving human welfare. The “invisi-
ble hand” of the market cannot be
relied on to solve these problems, Frank
notes, because “far from being a princi-
ple that applies in most circumstances,
the invisible hand is valid only in the
special case in which each individual’s
rewards are completely independent of
the choices made by others. In the
rivalrous world we live in, precious few
examples spring to mind” (p. 271).
After describing current trends in
luxury consumption in often shocking
detail, Frank looks at the psychological
research on the determinants of life sat-
isfaction and combines that research
with research on human evolution.
Individual humans have clearly
evolved to respond much more strong-
ly to relative position in a group than
to absolute position. As in all animal
species, the competition to survive and
reproduce rewards individuals that are
relatively more successful at finding
mates and raising offspring than their
peers. In humans and many other
mammals, mate selection by females is
influenced by the relative status of
males, because male status is often cor-
related with the success of their off-
spring. But these evolutionary process-
es, Frank points out, can be smart for
one but dumb for all. For example, the
relative size of a male elk’s antlers
determine his mating success. But
although the relative sizes of antlers in
the population have remained con-
stant, the absolute sizes have increased,
in a kind of “arms race.” The problem
with this strategy is, of course, that big
antlers hinder the male’s movements
and make them easier targets for preda-
tors. Likewise, individual humans get
caught in the same kind of trap by
pursuing their (perfectly rational)
individual incentives to increase their
relative status. The net effect is no
change in relative status—but huge
increases in wasteful consumption,
with its related costs.
Frank’s solution to luxury fever is a
strongly progressive consumption tax.
A simple one-line amendment in the
US tax code would exempt all savings
from income taxation. With this mod-
ification, the income tax would tax
only consumption, obviating the need
to specify which consumption was
“luxury consumption,” and (because
of its steep progressivity) it would do
so without adversely affecting the
poor. This consumption tax would
have the effect of increasing the costs
of conspicuous consumption for indi-
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viduals (and thus reducing it) while
freeing up significant resources to pur-
sue increased “inconspicuous con-
sumption”—things like education,
infrastructure, environmental protec-
tion, and family time. Given the psy-
chology of relative consumption and
satisfaction, this change could occur
with absolutely no decrease in human
welfare. In fact, average life satisfaction
would increase because relative indi-
vidual consumption would not change
and the neglected forms of social con-
sumption could be increased with the
resources from the tax.
Why has so obvious a “win–win”
move not already occurred, and what
are its chances in the future? Frank
answers the first part of this question
with the famous joke about the econo-
mist who sees a $10 bill lying in the
street and concludes that it couldn’t
really be a $10 bill because if it were,
someone would have already picked it
up. The first step is to clearly and con-
vincingly lay out the problem and the
solution as Frank has done—in effect,
to point out that the $10 bill is, in fact,
just lying on the ground. Indeed, the
idea of a broad consumption tax (and
the reasons for it) has been around for
many years. It was first proposed by
Thomas Hobbes in 1651 and has sur-
faced many times during the last 300
years (Seidman 1997). Frank con-
cludes that it will be just a matter of
time before the obvious benefits of
such a tax are recognized and the plan
is implemented—after all, most politi-
cal changes have a significant gestation
period. But there are also obvious
impediments to implementing such a
tax in the current political climate. In
political systems run more and more
by special interests, it is difficult to
agree on any policy that might hurt
even one of those interests, even if only
in the short run.
Frank supports the tax idea by not-
ing the “success” of environmental tax-
es in solving pollution problems
caused by forms of social traps analo-
gous to luxury fever. In reality, pollu-
tion taxes are still only very sparingly
used and have a long way to go before
they can be said to have solved pollu-
tion problems, even though the obvi-
ous win–win nature of this solution
has been pointed out by a broad range
of commentators and demonstrated in
the few situations for which it has been
tried (Bernow et al. 1998). The politi-
cal barriers to implementing pollution
taxes are similar to those for imple-
menting a broad-based consumption
tax, even though both taxes are really
“money for free” from society’s point
of view.
Overcoming the political impedi-
ments to meaningful tax reform will
require “government by discussion”
(Sen 1995) rather than by interest
groups and media manipulation. If
social issues of the importance of those
in Frank’s book can be discussed ratio-
nally by society at large, then such
obvious social win–win solutions as
ecological tax reform and a progressive
consumption tax can be appreciated
and implemented. In a few countries,
this kind of social discussion occurs
reasonably well, but in most it is a far
cry from current political reality. Just
as it is difficult for an animal caught in
a trap to free itself, it is also difficult for
a society caught in a social trap to free
itself—even when the nature of the
trap and the way out has been clearly
identified. Let’s hope that we don’t
have to bite off our social foot to
escape the invisible hand.
ROBERT COSTANZA
Center for Environmental Science,
Biology Department, and Institute for
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University of Maryland
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COUNTERING
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS’
GRAVE THREAT
Biological Weapons: Limiting the
Threat. Joshua Lederberg, ed. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999. 351 pp.,
illus. $20.00 (ISBN 0-262-62128-2
paper).
T
he grave threat posed by biological
weapons to global security is real. So
points out Defense Secretary William S.
Cohen in the foreword to Biological
Weapons: Limiting the Threat. The secu-
rity problems posed by biological
weapons, particularly their potential
use by terrorists to cause mass casual-
ties, presents a significant challenge—
both to the medical community, to pre-
pare for a horrific biological weapons
attack, and to the political community,
to prevent such an event from occur-
ring. International agreements have so
far failed to remove the threat of bio-
logical weapons. The 1972 Biological
Weapons and Toxins Convention did
not prevent Iraq from carrying out a
major biological weapons development
program. Nor did it halt the massive
biological weapons program of the for-
mer Soviet Union that has been detailed
by Ken Alibek, a former leader in that
illicit program, who defected to the
United States with tales of huge stock-
piles of smallpox, anthrax, and other
deadly agents. Particularly frightening
are the attempts by terrorist groups
such as the Aum Shinrikyo, which car-
ried out the nerve gas attack on the
Tokyo subway, to acquire biological
weapons that could cause massive civil-
ian casualties, and the possibility that
scientists from the former Soviet bio-
logical weapons programs may have
moved into state-sponsored terrorist
programs in Iraq and North Korea.
It is against this background that
